The Uruguay Round Grand Bargain
Prior to the Uruguay Round developing countries negotiated mainly to secure unreciprocated access to OECD countries' markets. Most lacked the expertise and analytical resources for trade policy-making but that really didn't matter much because the focus of negotiations was on border barriers for industrial products, and also because The Uruguay Round was a watershed in the evolution of that system. For the first time agriculture was at the centre of the negotiations and the European effort to block the launch of the negotiations to avoid coming to grips with the Common Agricultural Policy went on for half a decade. This foot-dragging also spawned a new single-interest coalition-the Australian-led Cairns Group, which included Southern countries from Latin America and Asia determined to ensure that liberalization of agricultural trade would not be relegated to the periphery by the Americans and the Europeans as it always had in the past. A significant event at the 1988 mid-term ministerial meeting in Montreal underlined this change when the Latin American members of the Cairns Group responded to an announcement by the U.S. and E.C. negotiators that, although there was no agreement on agriculture, all the other issues agreed at the meeting could go ahead, by rejecting all the agreed issues until the agricultural disputes were tackled. The meeting was adjourned, not terminated (this was Montreal, not Seattle) to be followed by another six years of hard slogging.
But the role of a group of developing countries, tagged the G10 hardliners and led by Brazil and India, was in many ways even more important in the Uruguay Round's transformation of the system. The G10 were bitterly opposed to the inclusion of the so- Moreover, by the onset of the 1990's a major change in economic policy was underway. The debt crisis of the 1980's, and thus the role of the IMF and the World Bank, plus the fall of the Berlin Wall-a confluence of two unrelated events-ushered in a major transformation in the economic policy paradigm. Economic reformsderegulation, privatization, liberalization --were seen as essential elements for launching and sustaining growth. Economic regulatory reform is at the heart of the concept of trade in services. Even without the thrust from the Uruguay Round, many developing countries began to see reform of key service sectors such as telecommunications as essential building blocks in the soft infrastructure underpinning growth and the GATS as a means to furthering domestic reform. While this changed view did not lead to significant liberalization in trade in services during the Round, acceptance of the GATS opened the way to further developments in the telecommunications and financial services negotiations.
Thus, well before the end of the Round the hardline coalition had disappeared and coalitions of developing countries concentrated on liberalization of agriculture and textiles and clothing, (3) Many undertook unilateral liberalization of tariffs and other trade barriers and at the conclusion in December 1993 were among the strongest supporters of the negotiations they so adamantly opposed in the 1980's. The Grand Bargain was completed and was quite different from old-time GATT reciprocity. It was essentially an implicit deal: the opening of OECD markets to agriculture and laborintensive manufactured goods, especially textiles and clothing, for the inclusion into the trading system of trade in services (GATS), intellectual property (TRIPS) and (albeit to a lesser extend than originally demanded) investment (TRIMS). And also-as a virtually last minute piece of the deal-the creation of a new institution, the WTO, with the strongest dispute settlement mechanism in the history of international law. Since the WTO consisted of a "single undertaking" (in WTO legal-ese) the deal was pretty much take it or leave it for the Southern countries. So they took it but, it's safe to say, without a full comprehension of the profoundly transformative implication of this new trading system.
The Northern piece of the bargain consisted of some limited progress in agriculture, with a commitment to go further in new negotiations in 2000; limited progress in textiles and clothing involving a promise to end the Multi Fibre Arrangement in 2005 with most of the restrictions to be eliminated later rather than sooner; a rather significant reduction in tariffs in goods in exchange for deeper cuts and more comprehensive bindings by developing countries (whose tariffs were higher with a smaller percentage of bindings) and with significant tariff peaks remaining on manufactured exports from developing countries; and virtual elimination of the new protectionism of the 1980's-the VER's (voluntary export restraints)-which were mostly relevant to Japan and some of the rapidly growing middle income countries in East Asia. (4) On the whole not great but not bad when compared with previous rounds centred on traditional GATT -type market access negotiations. But this was not a GATT negotiation as the Southern piece of the deal so amply demonstrates.
The essence of the South side of the deal-the inclusion of the new issues and the creation of the new institution-was to transform the multilateral trading system. Indeed the full transformation is still underway and difficult to forecast (especially after Seattle).
In the present context the most significant feature of the transformation was the shift in policy focus from the border barriers of the GATT to domestic regulatory and legal systems-the institutional infrastructure of the economy. The barriers to access for service providers stem from laws, regulations, administrative actions which impede cross-border trade and factor flows. Further, since these laws and administrative actions are for the most part "invisible" to outsiders, a key element in any negotiation is transparency, i.e. the publication of all relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures-as is common in all Northern societies. Implicit in this shift embodied in the GATS is a move away from GATT negative regulation-what governments must not do-to positive regulation-what governments must do. This aspect is now apparent in the telecommunications reference paper that set out a common framework for the regulation of competition in basic telecommunications. In the case of intellectual property the move to positive regulation is more dramatic since the negotiations covered not only standards for domestic laws but also detailed provisions for enforcement procedures to enforce individual (corporation) property rights. It's useful to note as well that in the area of social regulation (covering environmental, food safety, etc.) the positive regulatory approach is procedural rather than substantive.
The move from border barriers to domestic policy will require major upgrading and change in the institutional infrastructure of many or most Southern countries: governance; administrative regimes; legal systems; regulatory systems, etc. etc. These changes will take time and cost lots of money, as some recent analyses have shown. (5) The transition periods for implementation for developing countries were arbitrary and not based on any analysis or, indeed on any awareness of this systemic problem. The technical assistance promised by the North was not followed up. As Finger and Schuler aptly note: "the developing countries took a bound commitments to implement in exchange for unbound commitment of assistance". list goes on-and is getting longer. Many of these groups receive some funding from governmental or intergovernmental institutions but they are regarded, in respect to their activities, as NGO's. Together with a number of Southern NGO's these institutions provide two key strategic assets: knowledge and capacity-building for the Southern countries. Together they constitute a "virtual secretariat" through the increased used of the internet in the second half of the 1990's. The internet provided the means for knowledge diffusion both before, during, and after the Seattle meeting and facilitated the formulation of a policy agenda and a policy strategy for these countries.
But there is also a "real secretariat" for the South in a reinvigorated UNCTAD.
UNCTAD was created in 1964 and was largely a product of the Cold War as was the G77 bloc of developing countries. To undermine Soviet influence in developing countries the, OECD countries agreed to the "internationalization of welfare state principles." (11) One result was to embed in the GATT the broad concept of non-reciprocity and "special and The strategic assets of the OECD, the soft power (research capability and links to similar capabilities, governmental and academic, in national capitals that create the means to influence policy decision making) and the diffusion networks of key actors, both governmental and nongovernmental (through meetings, conferences, publications, etc.) are enhanced by the absence of rules or hard power since hard power constrains discussion, debate, and adaptability. The negotiation to launch the Uruguay Round negotiation demonstrated the OECD's role in providing analytic studies on key issuesespecially agriculture, trade in services, and the impact of protectionism on growth and inflation-for discussion in OECD committees and were also widely disseminated in member countries in order to raise public awareness and assist politicians who wanted an external counterweight to protectionist lobbying. The coordination of the overall strategy was, of course, the responsibility of senior officials in national capitals. But the OECD role as a generator of information, a forum for discussion, and the exercise of peer group pressure, was a central element in the design and implementation of the OECD strategy.
A reinvigorated UNCTAD could well play the same role for forging a Southern strategy.
This would help to "rebalance" the asymmetry in the Uruguay Round grand bargain. But it could also widen the North South divide if there were no policy forum in the WTO to perform the same function of debate and discussion of contentious issues. An "OECD-UNCTAD" debate could well be a dialogue of the deaf and make consensus more difficult to achieve. In the lead-up to the Uruguay Round the now extinct CG18 (Consultative Group of 18) provided such a forum in the GATT. But it was dominated by the Quad because the developing country members, especially the G10, had only a negative agenda and no soft power to counterbalance that of developed countries. Issues such as the implementation costs of the "new issues" and the like were never mentioned.
They were never discussed in national capitals or in the OECD. Trade ministers never met with ministers for development and the OECD trade committees never consulted its Development Directorate. That was how it was and that's how the grand bargain was finally forged. But one might say so what? As many trade experts often point out, the WTO is not a development agency. That argument is true but irrelevant, because trade is not trade today. And the new focus on domestic policy and institutions creates spillover and linkages among policy domains and international institutions that never existed in the GATT. Thus, the implications of the grand bargain far the evolution of the WTO are profound and deserve far more analysis than has been provided to date. The remainder of this paper can only highlight a few of the main issues.
North-South Issues: Implications for WTO Negotiations
It will be some time before a new round of negotiations is underway in part because of American domestic politics and also because no WTO member wants to risk another high profile failure. This is probably all to the good if the time is used to begin the process of trying to bridge the North-South divide. The futile debate on the implementation issues is unlikely to be resolved since the Americans are opposed to any across-the-board extension of transition periods demanded by the developing countries. A unilateral elimination of tariffs for the exports of the least developed would be a useful symbolic gesture but the most important issue that needs tackling is that of technical assistance for which the WTO is shockingly ill-equipped. As has been pointed out in a recent article on the WTO and the African countries, at least a doubling of the TA budget is urgently required. (14) There has been no response from the richest countries to the bare fact that the increase in the numbers of developing countries has doubled the number needing assistance while the TA budget has remained at about 2% of the total (which itself equals the travel budget of the IMF!). The reliance on individual donors has created a bias to short-term ad hocery (15) which is totally at variance with the generic and transformational dimensions of capacity building. The lack of interest in this aspect of the new trading system is perhaps best exemplified by the recent, and ultimately successful, effort to establish the Advisory Centre on WTO Law to help assist developing countries to cope with the new juridified dispute system. The project was supported by a small handful of OECD countries and opposed by, among others, the E.U and the U.S. This initiative, the first of its kind, was described by Renato Ruggiero a "new partnership against marginalization". Unfortunately the IF has run into some difficulties and is now in process of redesign. In any case, while the IF is a welcome initiative which may help the poorest countries improve their export capabilities it should be regarded as one part of a much broader program of capacity building which the WTO, with enhanced resources, should undertake in cooperation with other institutions, especially UNCTAD.
One might classify the rebalancing initiatives just described as confidence building although the term has been somewhat tarnished because the timid proposals by the Quad after Seattle were termed confidence shattering by one developing country representative. But, as I have argued many times since the end of the Uruguay Round, the present WTO structure is defective because of the lack of a policy forum and the paucity of a research capability to create a knowledge network with other institutions, academics, NGO's etc. This defect is even more serious when seen in the context of a North-South divide or an OECD-UNCTAD dialogue of the deaf. Some of the most contentious issues, which we will briefly note below, will require debate and discussion based on sophisticated and objective policy analysis if any reasonable consensus is to be achieved.
Of course, governments will make decisions on political grounds -as Schumpeter wisely noted, policy is the product of politics. But informed discussion in the WTO, in national capitals (and on the internet) may help to make good policy good politics.
As to the main issues in a new negotiation, probably the most contentious and difficult concerns the TRIPS agreement which must be reviewed as part of the built-in agenda but is unlikely to be discussed except in the context of a broader negotiation. The TRIPS agreement is the most radical example of the shift in policy to positive regulation of both substantive policy and legal procedures and hence institutions. The relationship to trade is minimal and, indeed, often negative so the term Trade Related Intellectual Property is close to being an oxymoron. The proposed "balance of benefits" for developing countries who are importers of technology was that TRIPS was essential to attract investment and foster indigenous innovation. There is a dearth of empirical research on this subject because it is probably too early for an assessment. The evidence that does exist suggests the payoffs thus far have been limited at best. Applying a onesize-fits-all approach to countries at widely differing stages of development and innovation capabilities was not likely to yield the best results. But the TRIPS agreement was a top priority for American multinationals in the pharmaceutical, software and entertainment industries who wanted it in the GATT rather than the UN agency WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) which had no enforcement mechanism.
So the TRIPS Agreement was contentious from the outset and indeed a number of trade economists opposed its inclusion in the round. But the law of unintended consequences has been at work and has both heightened and expanded the conflictual aspect of the agreement. What was not really evident in 1994 at the conclusion of the round was the acceleration of the biotechnology revolution. This has, of course, linked TRIPS with environmental and food safety issues (GMO's and all that) because of the enormous growth of the agribusiness firms, especially in the U.S. In the pharmaceutical industry, where the structure has been transformed by advances in the new technology, a key, unsettled issue in TRIPS concerns Article 27.3 (b) which allows members to exclude from patentability certain plant and animal inventions. This greatly concerns the American drug companies who are by a long distance the leaders in this sector.
While these issues (and others such as parallel imports, compulsory licensing, competition policy aspects of vertical restraints were all, in effect, left open to renewed negotiation) are not only North-South issues and, indeed, are almost as contentious across the Atlantic, there is one element which provides a strategic bargaining advantage for Southern countries. The OECD (mainly the U.S.) generates the technology and knowhow for the innovation process in biotechnology but the Southern countries own more than 80% of the world's genetic resources which provide the major input for the innovations. The basics of the new game are likely to include some sort of distributional deal in addition to the detailed legal minutiae that define rights to genetic resources and the protection of traditional rights and knowledge, etc., etc.
In the case of GMO's the issue seems much more complex and confusing. First of all, the Southern countries are divided, with the agricultural exporting countries (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) siding with the U.S., Canada and Australia in opposing any new restrictions on exports or imports in the WTO, while a large majority of Southern countries, aided by both Southern and Northern NGO's, have joined the anti GMO lobby. It may well be that this group is also engaged in strategic behaviour and sees the opposition to the biggest stakeholders -the agribusiness MNE's -as a useful first stage bargaining ploy. But since many of these Southern countries have -at least potentially -the most to gain from application of the new technology to satisfy their growing populations and to alleviate a range of nutritional and health problems, the opposition from governments and the southern NGO's is hard to understand. Of course it is true that the MNE's have little incentives to invest in innovations for the poorest countries. But there are other avenues to be explored to achieve these development objectives including subsidization by the OECD governments and/or other international institutions. Once again, however, there is no forum for discussion of these cross-cutting and complex issues. In the WTO, it's unlikely that they can be handled by the CTE (Committee on Trade and Environment) or the Council or TRIPS or as should be the case, both together.
Another one of the "new issues" which is a candidate for rebalancing in a new negotiation is trade in services. In preparing a positive agenda in UNCTAD and business fora it's clear that many developing countries are now aware that trade in services can provide significant export opportunities if there is more liberalization for labour access, or Mode 4, in GATS -parlance. Once again this can be viewed as rebalancing since the (understandable) priority for the OECD countries has been and will likely to continue to be on access for foreign direct investment (Mode3). A number of middle income Southern countries have a comparative advantage in the labour component of service production in sectors such as construction, transport, distribution, and the rapidly growing software sector in which the Indian industry is gaining global eminence. The concept of inter-modal trade-off may, however, be difficult because of the extreme sensitivity of the immigration issue in Europe (17) which will generate pressure to include some form of labour standards for temporary movement, a rather explosive issue for the WTO (see below). In the U.S. the situation appears somewhat more favorable because of the tight labor market. Indeed skill shortages could generate support for Mode 4 and make some American firms potential allies of Southern firms and this opportunity is already being explored. The danger is that the public at large may not understand the difference between immigration and temporary movement and, once again, informed policy analysis and discussions in both the WTO and in national capitals is essential. Finally, the 40 or 50 poorest countries in the WTO have poorly developed service sectors and will require domestic capacity building to overcome these supply constraints on exports.
With a rebalancing of both the TRIPS and GATS a new negotiation which included industrial tariffs, a more rapid elimination of the MFA, and (perhaps) more constraint on the use of a antidumping by both North and South could provide a core agenda of mutual benefit to both North and South. Other issues, such as a redefinition of S & D which is more appropriate to the new development paradigm, is under consideration in UNCTAD and NGO fora (18) . The EU proposal to include investment and competition policy has been rejected by almost all Southern countries, and neither item is supported by the U.S., but positions may change once a genuine negotiation on the agenda is underway. The demand for including labor standards by the Americans and (although in a much more moderate form by the Europeans) must be tackled or it could be a round-breaker. It should be pointed out that the same countries opposing the inclusion of labour standards in the WTO are also blocking any initiative in the ILO on voluntary corporate codes. Moreover, the lumping together of labour and environment by both Southern governments and NGO's is not defensible because, of course, environment is already "in" the WTO and must be part of an informed discussion in both the CTE and a policy forum because the alternative will be to regulate by litigation. The E-transparency issue will have to be negotiated as part of a new round, and flexibility on both sides -in the context of a rebalanced South-North deal -should produce a workable compromise.
Conclusions
The "bicycle theory" of trade liberalization -combat protectionist pressures by means of regular negotiations -is a metaphor based on the past. The cyclist was the U.S. and perhaps, a bicycle built for two could accommodate the E.U. on the back seat. The WTO today is like a crowded bus full of noisy passengers who can't (or won't) agree on the instructions for the poor, beleaguered driver. Yet, as suggested in this paper, it would not be impossible to arrange for a reasoned discussion on the road to take to reach an agreed destination.
The anti globalization NGO's are a diverse collection who disagree on many things but agree that corporate globalization (as they term it) is the source of the widening income disparity among countries and that the WTO is the main agent of corporate globalization. Clearly the widening disparity is related to differing growth rates and insofar as trade enhances growth -mainly by increasing the dynamic efficiencies from increased competition and access to knowledge -trade liberalization is a necessary, but obviously insufficient condition for improving global equality. It's the other "sufficients" that are so complex and difficult. To tackle the problem of marginalization and improve the opportunities for convergence in income levels among countries would require an unprecedented degree of international economic policy coordination among intergovernmental institutions. Until that is undertaken, alas, the WTO will continue to be a target for dissent and policy overload It's perhaps significant that the 2000 Okinawa G-8 summit was the first in the twenty-five year history of summitry that was largely dedicated to North-South issues. It is perhaps equally significant that the obligatory reference to a new round of WTO (2) CUSTA was the first international trade agreement that included services but for a number of reasons related to Canadian domestic policy and politics, intellectual property was not included and limited progress was made on the investment issue. But this was rectified by the NAFTA which improved on the services agreement of CUSTA, included IP and a comprehensive investment agreement. 
